VII

xx. THE 70.000 GIVEN AS PART OF A SETTLEM,ENT THAT WAS NOT CINSUMATED SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED RETURNED BY THE TRIAK COURT WRONGFULLY RETAINED BY ROTHARR OR MADE PART OF THE COMMUNITHY PROPERTY.

During the pendency of the action GRIFFIN in a good faith effort to enter a settlement of the property issue turned over to CORLETT and ROTHHAAR $70.000.00 as part of a settlement which CORLETT agreed to accept. After ROTHHAAR received the $70.000.00 CORLETT backed out of the agreement.

Despite repeated requests to ROTHHAAR he refused to return the money to GRIFFIN. GRIFFIN made a claim for the money as part of the divorce proceedings C.T. _____ but the court refused to consider the claim.

At the trial GRIFFIN contended that he was ewntitled to recover the $70.000.00 which was GRIFFIN'S separate property which was turned over to ROTHHAAR by GRIFFIN as part of a proposed settlement, which was ultimately rejected by CORLETT.

Despite repeated demands ROTHHAAR refused to return GRIFFIN'S separate property. ROTHHAAR placed the $70,000 in a trust account and GRIFFIN contended that he was entitled to the return of the $70,000. CORLETT collected spousal support, R. T. Page 10 line 23, which lawfully can only be enforced by Family Code Section 4501 with a family court order, thereby depriving GRIFFIN of due process and the opportunity to offer a defense.

VII. CORLETT ENFORCED A SPOUSAL ORDER IN BANKRUPTCY AND
      OBTAINED $69,000 AND THIS AMOUNT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
      INCLUDED IN THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY BECAUSE THE
      BANKRUPTCY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE
     THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT ORDER

In re Rossi v Rossi (2001) Cal Ct App 4th Vol 90 states: Civil Code section 3294 (3) 'Fraud' means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury . . . ."

The judgment for spousal support was recorded on the community property home in the amount of zero dollars unlawfully as an abstract of judgment must state an amount in dollars: As in Corner, 27 B.R.1018 (B.A.P.9th Cir.1983) states (amount of support arrearages set in family court could not be attacked in bankruptcy court). As in Fitzgerald 9 F 3d 521 divorce, alimony, support and maintenance are issues within the exclusive domain of the state court.

The federal court is prohibited from changing or interfering with a state court judgment. However evidenced by C. T. 166 and R. T. page 10 line 23, STRICKLING did in fact attack the order for spousal support in the bankruptcy court, subsequently foreclosed on that judgment unlawfully and gave CORLETT $69,443.00 (see page two line 3 of order) and C. T. 166. Thirteen months after GRIFFIN'S discharge.

Pursuant to: Family Code Section 290, 292 enforcement of a support judgment must be by contempt proceedings in Family Court. Therefore GRIFFIN is entitled to and must be given the opportunity to cure this contempt with a hearing on the issues. C.C. P sec 726 (a) states "There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt" C. C. C sec 2910 "The sale of any property on which there is a lien, in satisfaction of the claim secured thereby, or in the case of personal property, its wrongful conversion by the person holding the lien, extinguishes the lien thereon".

Therefore for the forgoing reasons CORLETT committed fraud by foreclosing on her own property and collecting support in the wrong jurisdiction.

The proper collection device is a writ of execution pursuant to the C.C.P.290. CORLETT circumvented this procedure by using the bankruptcy court C.T.166 and conspiring with STRICKLING. Furthermore the trial court did not rule on this issue. CORLETT in Bankruptcy Court and also in Trial Court introduced no evidence whatsoever; that in fact CORLETT had obtained separate community property in Superior Court. Therefore pursuant to C.C. P. 473, and as in re Marriage of Baltins (1989) 21 CA3d 66,80 260 CR 403,411, CORLETT obtained her community assets by extrinsic fraud and any judgments CORLETT obtained must be set aside by this court.

There is no statutory authority for the Bankruptcy Court to hear a claim for spousal support thirteen months after GRIFFIN was discharged from that court. However there is authority to support GRIFFIN`S claim that, that court did not have jurisdiction, therefore the court made a jurisdictional error that should be reversed.

GRIFFIN requests that the Appellate Court use the power afforded the court to set aside the order issued by the Trial Court and set aside the orders by the Bankruptcy Court. A new trial must be set to give GRIFFIN the opportunity to have a fair trial and answer the support judgment issue.

To recover GRIFFIN'S separate property which was turned over to ROTHHAAR by GRIFFIN as part of a proposed settlement, which was ultimately rejected by CORLETT. Despite repeated demands ROTHHAAR refused to return GRIFFIN'S separate property. ROTHHAAR placed the $70,000 in a trust account and GRIFFIN contended that he was entitled to the return of the $70,000,R.T Page 14 line 1 thru 28.

Pursuant to: ( Witkin, Cal Procedure 2d Ed 1971 ) Appeal, & 2 15, .4205; it is void and must be reversed).